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Legislative Facts in Grutter v. Bollinger

CARL A. AUERBACH*

In 1924, Henry Wolf Biklé, a Philadelphia lawyer who also taught at
the University of Pennsylvania Law School for twenty-eight years,
published a pioneering article to show that the constitutional validity of
legislative action often depended on generalizations about social,
economic, political, scientific, medical, or psychological matters that
reviewing courts, particularly the United States Supreme Court, accepted
as true. 1 One of the examples Biklé gave was the Lochner case, 2 in
which the Supreme Court held that a state law limiting the hours worked
in bakeshops had “no substantial relation to the promotion of the public
health.” 3
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis called these factual generalizations
“legislative facts”—facts which “assist in the creation of law or the
determination of policy”—and distinguished them from “adjudicative
facts”—facts of the particular case which concern only the parties to the
case and answer the questions who did what to whom, where, when,
how, why, with what motive and intent. 4 These terms have come to be
generally accepted. The term legislative facts includes the findings of
fact that accompany and justify legislation by Congress and the state
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I wish to thank
Linda Auerbach Allderdice and Eric Auerbach for their helpful comments on earlier
versions of this paper, and Judith Lihosit and Brian Williams for their research
assistance.
1. Henry Wolf Biklé, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the
Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1924).
2. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3. Biklé, supra note 1, at 7.
4. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–25 (1942); see also FED. R. EVID.
201(a) advisory committee’s note.
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legislatures as well as the factual generalizations invoked by courts and
administrative agencies to justify the laws they make. 5
Dissatisfaction with the way courts have handled legislative facts has
a long lineage. In 1930, Dean Herbert Goodrich of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School complained that
[w]e really know very little about how our legal rules affect the conduct and
welfare of the men and women to whom they are applied. . . . Judges have laid
down rules on the basis of public policy without the slightest support for the
policy except preconceived opinion, and without either knowing or having
means of knowing whether the policy declared was or was not aided by the
particular decision rendered. 6

Philosopher Morris R. Cohen found in 1933 that courts were “making all
sorts of factual generalizations without adequate information” and the
“facilities of our courts for acquiring information as to actual conditions
are very limited.” 7 He also cautioned that “the law cannot simply and
uncritically accept all the opinions of economists or sociologists.” 8
These concerns were not alleviated by Federal Rule of Evidence 201,
which adopts Professor Davis’s distinction between adjudicative and
legislative facts.9 The Notes of the Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee
explain that Rule 201 deals only with judicial notice of adjudicative facts
and that none of the Federal Rules of Evidence deals with judicial notice
of legislative facts. Nor did any other federal statute or rule of civil or
criminal procedure govern the judicial notice of legislative facts until the
enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in 1975. 10 According to the
Advisory Committee, this omission from Rule 201 was intended to
permit legislative facts to be judicially noticed, even if they did not
satisfy the requirements for the judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
Under Rule 201, judicial notice may be taken of adjudicative facts only
if they are not “subject to reasonable dispute” because they are
“generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court” or
5. See generally THE LEGAL PROCESS 90–137 (Carl A. Auerbach et al. eds., 1961)
(collecting various articles and sources addressing the legislative fact issues in the School
Segregation Cases and the judiciary’s role); Carl A. Auerbach, The Anatomy of an
Unusual Economic Substantive Due Process Case: Workers’ Compensation Insurers
Rating Association v. State, 68 MINN. L. REV. 545, 581–612 (1984) (discussing judicial
consideration of legislative fact issues in workers’ compensation rate regulation).
6. Herbert F. Goodrich, The Improvement of the Law, 4 TEMPLE L.Q. 311, 324–25
(1930).
7. MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 186 (Archon Books 1967)
(1933).
8. Id.
9. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee’s note.
10. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1937 (enacting the
Federal Rules of Evidence); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
744 (4th ed. 2002).
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they are “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” 11
The Advisory Committee also explained that courts are not required to
inform the parties of the legislative facts to be judicially noticed or to
give them an opportunity to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial
notice “other than [the requirements] already inherent in affording
opportunity to hear and be heard and exchanging briefs.” 12 Nor are the
courts at any level required to make formal findings of the legislative
facts judicially noticed. However, the Advisory Committee suggested the
possibility should be left open “of introducing evidence through regular
channels in appropriate situations,” citing, as an example, Borden’s Farm
Products Co. v. Baldwin,13 “where the cause was remanded for the taking
of evidence as to the economic conditions and trade practices underlying
the New York Milk Control Law.” 14
Biklé was of the opinion that the training and experience of judges did
not qualify them “to deal in an expert way” with legislative facts and so
they “should not undertake to do so except when the relevant facts are
properly brought before them either by means of direct evidence or
through such presentation as justifies judicial notice.” 15 He thought the
Supreme Court of his time handled the ascertainment of legislative facts
that determined constitutional validity in three different ways. As in
Lochner, the Court decided “the controlling questions of fact on the
basis of a priori reasoning.” 16 As in Muller v. Oregon, it took judicial
notice of the legislative facts set forth in the Brandeis brief in that case to
show the existence “of a widespread belief that woman’s physical
structure, and the functions she performs in consequence thereof, justify
special legislation restricting or qualifying the conditions under which
she should be permitted to toil.” 17 And as in Chastleton Corp. v.
Sinclair, 18 the Supreme Court required the taking of evidence by the trial
court on legislative facts—whether the war-created emergency that
justified rent control in the District of Columbia in 1919 ended by 1922.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

FED. R. EVID. 201(b).
FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee’s note.
293 U.S. 194 (1934).
FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee’s note.
Biklé, supra note 1, at 21.
Id. at 12.
208 U.S. 412, 420 (1908).
264 U.S. 543 (1924).

35

AUERBACH POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC

4/22/2008 1:20:38 PM

Currently, Professor Pierce writes, in determining the legislative facts
that will resolve issues of law and policy, federal judges and Supreme
Court Justices
rely on some combination of their own prior knowledge of relevant fields and
the writings of experts in the relevant fields. In this process, they are not
limited to writings in the evidentiary record compiled in the trial court or even
to writings brought to their attention in briefs or in oral arguments. They can,
and often do, rely on sources they discover in their own research (or that of their
clerks) and on sources with which they had prior familiarity in some other
context. 19

In some cases, legislative facts of constitutional significance have
been presented at the trial stage by expert witnesses subject to crossexamination and rebuttal. In others, the Court has taken judicial notice
of legislative facts without giving the parties an opportunity to challenge
them. In the School Segregation Cases, 20 more than forty psychiatrists,
psychologists, social scientists, and educators testified in four of the five
cases in the federal district courts on the harmful effects of legally
enforced school segregation and the anticipated consequences of
desegregation. They sought to show that the assumption of innate
intellectual differences between races is scientifically unsound and,
therefore, the classification of pupils on a racial basis did not fulfill a
reasonable educational purpose but harmed black children. They also
testified that school desegregation could be accomplished without undue
conflict or violence, provided strong government leadership was
exercised.
At the appellate stage, thirty-two sociologists, anthropologists, psychiatrists,
and psychologists working in the field of American race relations
submitted The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of
Desegregation: A Social Science Statement as an appendix to appellants’
briefs in these cases. 21 The Supreme Court took judicial notice of the
Statement in its famous footnote 11, which referred to a finding in the
Kansas case by the federal district court that legally enforced segregation
in the public schools had a detrimental effect upon the black children
because it implied their inferiority and so retarded their educational and
mental development. This finding, the Court held, was “amply supported

19. PIERCE, supra note 10, at 745–46. The failure of Rule 201 to deal with the
judicial notice of legislative facts has led some courts to apply the requirements for the
judicial notice of adjudicative facts to legislative facts, despite the Advisory Committee
Notes.
20. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. Appendix to Brief for Appellants, Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (Nos. 1, 2, 4, 10),
reprinted in 37 MINN. L. REV. 427 (1953).
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by modern authority” and, in footnote 11, it listed the pertinent works of
the experts who embodied modern authority. 22
The treatment of the disputed legislative facts in the School
Segregation Cases was procedurally fair to the parties because the
experts who testified to them in the federal district courts were subject to
cross-examination and rebuttal. The Social Science Statement in the
Brief for the Appellants in the Supreme Court contained little that was
not covered by the testimony in the lower federal courts.
By way of contrast, in Roe v. Wade, 23 as Judge Friendly has written,
“no evidence was offered at the hearing before the three-judge court
except affidavits of two physicians that legal abortions were extremely
safe and illegal abortions were exceedingly dangerous.” 24 But the
appellants’ brief in the Supreme Court had a supplementary appendix
“characterized as being ‘offset reproductions of particularly relevant
legal, medical and social science publications, all of which are in the
public domain,’” and amici briefs supporting appellants also contained
extensive factual generalizations of which the Court was asked to take
judicial notice. 25 In addition, Justice Blackmun conducted research on
his own to ascertain the legislative facts he regarded as material. The
parties in the litigation were given no opportunity to comment on or
rebut the legislative facts Justice Blackmun found and incorporated in
his opinion. The Federal Rules of Evidence, as Judge Friendly pointed
out, did not require that such an opportunity be afforded. 26 And, it
might be added, the Supreme Court has not held that due process
requires it. Nevertheless, Judge Friendly concluded, whenever a court
intends to take judicial notice of data outside the record to help it
formulate a rule of constitutional law, it should, as a matter of fairness
and to prevent egregious error, submit the data to the parties for
examination, cross-examination, and rebuttal. 27
22. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 & n.11.
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24. Henry J. Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure, 33
U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 36 (1978).
25. Id. at 36–37 (quoting Arthur Selwyn Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme
Court, The Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary
Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187, 1200 (1975)).
26. Id. at 38; FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee’s note.
27. Friendly, supra note 24, at 38–39; see also JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS
WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW 181–351 (5th ed. 2002); Joseph A. Colquitt, Judicial
Use of Social Science Evidence at Trial, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 51 (1988); George D. Marlow,
From Black Robes to White Lab Coats: The Ethical Implications of a Judge’s Sua
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If Judge Friendly’s advice is followed and legislative facts of
constitutional significance are sought to be presented at the trial stage,
subject to cross-examination and rebuttal, Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
enacted in 1975, will apply. As enacted, Rule 702 provided: “If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” 28 In
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court held that
Rule 702 imposes upon the trial judge a “gatekeeping responsibility” to
make “a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony [of an expert witness] is scientifically valid and
of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the
facts in issue.” 29 In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the Court added that
the trial judge’s ruling to admit or exclude such expert testimony would
be reviewed by the appellate court only for abuse of discretion. 30
Relying upon the express language of Rule 702, the Court held in
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael 31 that trial judges are obliged to perform
this gatekeeping function not only when scientific evidence is in
question but also when other technical or specialized knowledge is
involved. In response to Daubert and Kumho Tire Co., Rule 702 was
amended in 2000 to add that experts may testify “in the form of an
opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and

Sponte, Ex Parte Acquisition of Social and Other Scientific Evidence During the
Decision-Making Process, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 291 (1998); John Monahan & Laurens
Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science Research, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 571 (1991);
Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in
Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987); Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., A Trial Judge’s Freedom and
Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1291–96 (1952).
It is interesting to contrast the Court’s approach to official notice with its treatment of
judicial notice. If an administrative agency takes official notice of a contested material
legislative fact in the course of formal adjudication or formal rulemaking, section
556(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act requires the agency to provide a party
requesting it with a meaningful “opportunity to show the contrary.” PIERCE, supra note
10, ch. 10.6. Even when the agency is engaged in informal adjudication or rulemaking
and section 556(e) does not apply, courts require the agency to notify the parties of the
legislative facts that will be officially noticed so as to afford them a meaningful
opportunity to comment upon them. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 10, chs. 7.3, 7.5. Yet
courts do not impose similar requirements upon themselves when they take judicial
notice of contested material legislative facts.
28. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1937 (enacting the
Federal Rules of Evidence).
29. 509 U.S. 579, 589 n.7, 592–93 (1993).
30. 522 U.S. 136, 141–43 (1997).
31. 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
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methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case.” 32
The express language of Rule 702, as read in Kumho Tire Co., makes
it applicable to legislative facts which require technical and other
specialized knowledge for their determination and are proffered by
experts at the trial stage. 33 Furthermore, even when the federal court
intends to take judicial notice of such legislative facts, Rule 702 as
amended provides some general standards that the court should use to
determine for itself the propriety of taking such action. If the trial court
would not have admitted the proffered testimony, it should not take
judicial notice of the legislative facts that such testimony would have
presented. This conclusion is buttressed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan34
and Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. 35 when
legislative facts of constitutional significance are involved.
Yet none of the opinions in the affirmative action cases mention Rule
702, Sullivan, or Bose Corp. Although the Advisory Committee Notes
accompanying the 2000 amendments do not use the term legislative
facts, the expert testimony they describe includes testimony about
legislative facts. But the Notes do not treat legislative facts, even those
of constitutional significance, differently from adjudicative facts. They
assume that juries will ultimately determine the facts, but judges, not
juries, determine legislative facts. 36 The findings of legislative facts by
a trial judge are not reviewed by an appellate court under the clearly
erroneous standard of Federal Rule of Evidence 52(a). Each appellate
court exercises its independent judgment in determining the legislative
32. FED. R. EVID. 702. In accordance with the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
currently located at 28 U.S.C. § 2071–2077 (2000), the amendments were proposed and
drafted by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules. They were
then exposed to public comment. Thereafter, they were submitted to the Supreme Court
for consideration and promulgation. After promulgating the changes, the Supreme Court
submitted them to Congress. Congress did not exercise the veto power it has under the
Rules Enabling Act and the amendments became effective December 1, 2000.
33. Linda Auerbach Allderdice, my daughter, called my attention to Rule 702 in
this context.
34. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
35. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
36. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 514–15 (1951) (holding that the
Court, not the jury, would determine whether the worldwide Communist movement
presented a “clear and present danger” of overthrowing the Government—a legislative
fact); Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924); Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line Co.,
211 U.S. 210 (1908); 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 2555(c) (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981).
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facts, and the Supreme Court has the final word. 37 Nor does General
Electric Co. apply if legislative facts are at issue. Appellate courts should
exercise their independent judgment with respect to the admissibility of
expert testimony regarding legislative facts.
That the Supreme Court must independently determine the material
legislative facts, especially if they have constitutional significance, is
made clear in Sullivan and Bose Corp. In Sullivan, the Supreme Court
created a federal rule prohibiting public officials from recovering
damages for defamatory false statements relating to their official
conduct unless they proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
statements were made with “actual malice,” that is, with knowledge that
they were false or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or
not. 38 The Court then held that it would independently determine
whether the record justified a finding that actual malice existed in the
particular case and stated: “This Court’s duty is not limited to the
elaboration of constitutional principles; we must also in proper cases
review the evidence to make certain that those principles have been
constitutionally applied. . . . We must ‘make an independent examination of
the whole record’. . . .” 39 In a footnote, the Court further stated that it
must “review the finding of facts [of state trial judges] . . . where a
conclusion of law as to a Federal right and a finding of fact are so
intermingled as to make it necessary . . . .” 40 Whether actual malice
exists in a particular case is, of course, an issue of adjudicative fact.
In affirming Sullivan in Bose Corp., 41 the Court explicitly held that an
appellate court’s review of a trial court’s finding of actual malice was
not governed by the clearly erroneous standard of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a). Rather, as a matter of “federal constitutional law,”
appellate courts “must exercise independent judgment and determine
whether the record establishes actual malice with convincing clarity.” 42
As Professor Monahan has written, Sullivan and Bose Corp. do not
apply only when the First Amendment is at issue but “independent
judgment in the first amendment context is merely one example of a
systemic issue: the scope of judicial review of the adjudicative facts
decisive of constitutional claims.” 43
37. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168–69 n.3 (1986).
38. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283, 285–86.
39. Id. at 285 (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)).
40. Id. at 285 n.26 (quoting Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385 (1927)).
41. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984).
42. Id. at 510, 514 (emphasis added); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact
Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 229 (1985).
43. Monaghan, supra note 42, at 230. Monaghan argues that federal appellate
courts should be authorized, but not required, to review lower federal and state court
findings of adjudicative facts decisive of constitutional law application unless law
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If the independent determination of adjudicative facts is required by
Sullivan and Bose Corp. to ensure that constitutional principles are properly
applied in the particular case, then the independent determination of
constitutionally significant legislative facts is even more necessary to
decide the constitutional principles that will be applied.
In upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s preferential
racial and ethnic admissions program, the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger
did not mention the applicability of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 at the
trial stage of the case. 44 Many expert witnesses testified in the federal
district court that tried Grutter. No objection seems to have been raised
by any party that the testimony of any expert was inadmissible because
the methodology used was invalid when tested by accepted social
science standards, the methodology was applied improperly in determining
the legislative facts, or for any other reason. For example, Professor
Patricia Gurin was the most important witness for the University of
Michigan and the Grutter Court relied on her Expert Report. 45 In her
Report, Professor Gurin stated that the data she used were not collected
for purposes of the litigation but that her analysis was prepared for
litigation purposes. 46 Professor Gurin has been associated with the
University of Michigan since 1966. 47 From 1974 to 2002, she was
Professor of Psychology and Women’s Studies. She served as Chair of
the Department of Psychology from 1991 to 1998 and from 1999 to
2002. In 1998–1999, she was Interim Dean of the College of Literature,
Science, and the Arts. Since 2002, she has been Director of Research in
Michigan’s Program on Intergroup Relations.
Should Professor Gurin’s long association with the University of
Michigan and the fact that she prepared her Expert Report for the
litigation have disqualified her from testifying on the university’s
behalf? On remand in Daubert, Judge Kozinsky expressed his views
about such a situation:

application in the particular case “necessitates an appreciable measure of further
constitutional norm elaboration.” Id. at 276. Disputed legislative facts determine the
content of the constitutional norm.
44. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
45. Expert Witness Report of Patricia Y. Gurin, Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp.
2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (No. 97-CV-75231-DT), reprinted in 5 MICH. J. RACE & L.
363, 368, 422 (1999).
46. Id. at 9, 47.
47. Curriculum Vitae of Patricia Gurin (May 2002), http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/
admissions/legal/expert/gurinapa.html.
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One very significant fact to be considered is whether the experts are
proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research
they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have
developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying. That an expert
testifies for money does not necessarily cast doubt on the reliability of his
testimony, as few experts appear in court merely as an eleemosynary gesture.
But in determining whether proposed expert testimony amounts to good science,
we may not ignore the fact that a scientist’s normal workplace is the lab or the
field, not the courtroom or the lawyer’s office.
That an expert testifies based on research he has conducted independent of
the litigation provides important, objective proof that the research comports
with dictates of good science. . . . For one thing, experts whose findings flow
from existing research are less likely to have been biased toward a particular
conclusion by the promise of remuneration; when an expert prepares reports and
findings before being hired as a witness, that record will limit the degree to
which he can tailor his testimony to serve a party’s interests. . . . That the
testimony proffered by an expert is based directly on legitimate, preexisting
research unrelated to the litigation provides the most persuasive basis for
concluding that the opinions he expresses were “derived by the scientific
method.”
....
If the proffered expert testimony is not based on independent research, the
party proffering it must come forward with other objective, verifiable evidence
that the testimony is based on “scientifically valid principles.” One means of
showing this is by proof that the research and analysis supporting the proffered
conclusions have been subjected to normal scientific scrutiny through peer
review and publication. . . .
....
. . . [T]he test under Daubert is not the correctness of the expert’s conclusions but
the soundness of his methodology. 48

It should be noted that Judge Kozinski exercised independent judgment
in holding that plaintiffs’ proffered expert scientific testimony was not
admissible to prove that defendant’s pills caused their birth defects. 49
He rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the case should be remanded to the
federal district court so that it could make the initial determination of
admissibility under the standard announced by the Supreme Court in
Daubert. 50 He explained that “[i]n the peculiar circumstances of this
case, however, we have determined that the interests of justice and
judicial economy will best be served by deciding those issues that are
properly before us and, in the process, offering guidance on the application
of the Daubert standard in this circuit.” 51 Judge Kozinski did not read
Rule 702 or General Electric as requiring the determination of admissibility
of expert testimony to be made by the trial court in the first instance.

48. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317–18 (9th Cir. 1995)
(footnotes and citations omitted).
49. Id. at 1322.
50. Id. at 1314–15.
51. Id. at 1315.
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Furthermore, when the expert testimony, as in Grutter, concerns legislative
facts of constitutional significance, which the courts must determine
independently, the “gatekeeping responsibility” to assess the propriety of
admitting proffered expert testimony must be discharged whether or not
there is objection to its admission. The courts in Grutter did not
discharge this responsibility or even mention Rule 702.
Not a single Justice in Grutter indicated an awareness of what was
required of the Court in exercising independent judgment to resolve
disputes about legislative facts of constitutional significance. No
mention was made of Sullivan or Bose Corp. Yet, as a review of the
decision will demonstrate, it was the Justices’ differing assumptions
about the material legislative facts that led to their differing views of the
constitutionality of the preferential racial and ethnic admissions program
challenged in Grutter.
“We granted certiorari,” wrote Justice O’Connor for the Court, “to
resolve the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals on a question of
national importance: Whether [student body] diversity is a compelling
[state] interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in
selecting applicants for admission to public universities.” 52 To answer
this question, the Court was required to engage in strict scrutiny of the
only justification claimed for such use of race—to obtain “the
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.” 53 In
holding that the University of Michigan Law School “has a compelling
interest in attaining a diverse student body,” 54 Justice O’Connor wrote:
The Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its
educational mission is one to which we defer. The Law School’s assessment
that diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits is substantiated by
respondents and their amici. Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law
School is no less strict for taking into account complex educational judgments
in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university. Our holding
today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a
university’s academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits. . . .
. . . Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse
student body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at
the heart of the Law School’s proper institutional mission, and that “good faith”
on the part of a university is “presumed” absent “a showing to the contrary.” 55

52. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322 (2003).
53. Id. at 328 (quoting Brief for Respondent Bollinger, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No.
02-241)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 328–29 (citations omitted).
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The educational benefits that student body diversity—that is, enrolling a
critical mass of racial and ethnic minority students—is designed to
produce are substantial, concluded Justice O’Connor. 56 The Justice then
cited the district court’s findings that the law school’s preferential
admissions policy promotes
“cross-racial understanding,” helps to break down racial stereotypes, and
“enables [students] to better understand persons of different races.” . . . These
benefits are “important and laudable,” because “classroom discussion is livelier,
more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting” when the students
have “the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.” 57

Justice O’Connor added:
The Law School’s claim of a compelling interest is further bolstered by its
amici, who point to the educational benefits that flow from student body
diversity. In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at
trial, numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning
outcomes, and “better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce
and society, and better prepares them as professionals.” Brief for American
Educational Research Association et al. [the Association of American Colleges
and Universities and the American Association for Higher Education] as Amici
Curiae 3; see, e.g., W. Bowen & D. Bok, The Shape of the River (1998);
Diversity Challenged: Evidence on the Impact of Affirmative Action (G.
Orfield & M. Kurlaender eds. 2001); Compelling Interest: Examining the
Evidence on Racial Dynamics in Colleges and Universities (M. Chang, D. Witt,
J. Jones, & K. Hakuta eds. 2003). 58

Justice O’Connor cited the amici curiae briefs in support of the
University of Michigan Law School filed by 3M and sixty-four other
business corporations and separately by the General Motors Corporation,
which maintained that the educational benefits flowing from student
body diversity are “real,” not “theoretical,” because the “skills needed in
today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.” 59
The Justice then quoted from the amici curiae brief in support of the law
school by Lieutenant-General Julius W. Becton, Jr.; nine other generals
and admirals, including former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
supervisors of the service academies; former Senators Max Cleland and
Robert J. Kerrey and other war heroes with high government experience;
and civilian leaders Daniel W. Christman and the Honorable William
Cohen. Justice O’Connor wrote:

56.
57.
58.
59.
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[H]igh-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States military
assert that, “[b]ased on [their] decades of experience,” a “highly qualified,
racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its
principal mission to provide national security.” . . . At present, “the military
cannot achieve an officer corps that is both highly qualified and racially diverse
unless the service academies and the ROTC [Reserve Officers Training Corps]
used limited race-conscious recruiting and admissions policies.” . . . We agree
that “[i]t requires only a small step from this analysis to conclude that our
country’s other most selective institutions must remain both diverse and
selective.” 60

Relying upon the amicus curiae brief of the Association of American
Law Schools, Justice O’Connor states that law schools “represent the
training ground for a large number of our Nation’s leaders.” 61
Individuals with law degrees occupy roughly half the state governorships, more
than half the seats in the United States Senate, and more than a third of the seats
in the United States House of Representatives. . . . The pattern is even more
striking when it comes to highly selective law schools. A handful of these
schools accounts for 25 of the 100 United States Senators, 74 United States
Courts of Appeals judges, and nearly 200 of the more than 600 United States
District Court judges. . . .
. . . Access to legal education (and thus the legal profession) must be
inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity, so
that all members of our heterogeneous society may participate in the educational
institutions that provide the training and education necessary to succeed in
America. 62

Thus, Justice O’Connor justified the University of Michigan Law
School’s preferential admissions program by taking judicial notice and
accepting the validity of the legislative facts asserted in the amici curiae
briefs and publications she cited. The Justice added that the law school’s
“assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits is
substantiated by respondents and their amici.” 63 At least sixty-one amici
curiae briefs were filed in support of the law school, in addition to the
five cited by Justice O’Connor. 64

60. Id. at 331.
61. Id. at 332.
62. Id. at 332–33.
63. Id. at 328.
64. Briefs were filed on behalf of (1) the New Mexico Hispanic Bar Association,
Black Lawyers Association, and Indian Bar Association; (2) the Society of American
Law Teachers; (3) the American Law Deans Association; (4) the Lawyers’ Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.,
National Women’s Law Center, National Partnership for Women & Families, Coalition
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of Bar Associations of Color, and Sigma Pi Phi Fraternity; (5) the University of
Michigan Asian Pacific American Law Students Association, Black Law Students’
Alliance, Latino Law Students Association, and Native American Law Students
Association; (6) the Deans of Georgetown Law Center, Duke Law School, University of
Pennsylvania Law School, Yale Law School, Columbia Law School, University of
Chicago Law School, New York University Law School, Stanford Law School, Cornell
Law School, and Northwestern University School of Law; (7) the National Center for
Fair & Open Testing (Fairtest); (8) the New York State Black and Puerto Rican
Legislative Caucus; (9) the American Sociological Association; (10) the Arizona State
University College of Law; (11) the Coalition for Economic Equity, the Santa Clara
University School of Law Center for Social Justice and Public Service, the Justice
Collective, the Charles Houston Bar Association, and the California Association of Black
Lawyers; (12) the Hispanic National Bar Association and the Hispanic Association of
Colleges and Universities; (13) the King County Bar Association; (14) the Black Law
Students Associations of Harvard, Stanford, and Yale; (15) the Law School Admission
Council; (16) the Clinical Legal Education Association; (17) the Veterans of the
Southern Civil Rights Movement and Family Members of Murdered Civil Rights
Activists; (18) 13,922 Current Law Students at Accredited American Law Schools; (19)
UCLA School of Law Students of Color; (20) Latino Organizations; (21) the Association
of American Medical Colleges; (22) the American Council on Education and 52 other
Higher Education Organizations; (23) Graduate Management Admission Council and the
Executive Leadership Council; (24) and (25) the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc. and the American Civil Liberties Union (Feb. 14 and Feb. 19,
2003); (26) members and former members of the Pennsylvania General Assembly and
Pennsylvania Civic Leaders; (27) the Michigan Black Law Alumni Society; (28) the
School of Law of the University of North Carolina; (29) the Bay Mills Indian
Community, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, Hannahville Indian
Community, Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake
Superior Chippewa Indians, Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, Little Traverse Bay
Bands of Ottawa Indians, Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians of
Michigan, Nottawaseppi Huron Band of Potawatomi, Oneida Tribe of Indians of
Wisconsin, Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, and Michigan Indian; (30) the
Students of Howard University School of Law; (31) a Committee of Concerned Black
Graduates of ABA Accredited Law Schools; (32) National School Board Association, et
al.; (33) American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; (34)
the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and the LCCR Education Fund; (35) New
York City Council, the Speaker, and individual members of the Council; (36) the States
of Maryland, New York, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the Territory of
the Virgin Islands; (37) Howard University; (38) Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Leland Stanford Junior University, E.I. Du Pont De Nemours, International Business
Machines Corp., National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering,
National Action Council for Minorities in Engineering; (39) the American Psychological
Association; (40) Congressman John Conyers, Jr. and twelve other members of
Congress; (41) 65 Leading American Businesses; (42) the University of Pittsburgh,
Temple University, Wayne State University, and the University of Arizona; (43) City of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, City of Cleveland, Ohio, and the National Conference of
Black Mayors, Inc.; (44) Harvard University, Brown University, the University of
Chicago, Dartmouth College, Duke University, the University of Pennsylvania, Princeton
University, and Yale University; (45) the National Education Association et al.; (46) the
National Urban League, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Los Angeles,
and the National Rainbow/Push Coalition; (47) the New America Alliance; (48) the
Social Scientists Glenn C. Loury, Nathan Glazer, John F. Kain, Douglas Massey, Marta
Tienda, and Brian Bucks; (49) the United Negro College Fund and Kappa Alpha PSI;
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Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice O’Connor’s
opinion. Only Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion, which dealt
with the twenty-five-year limit the Court placed on its decision and
called attention to the fact that placing a limit on race-conscious programs
“accords with the international understanding of the office of affirmative
action.” 65 Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Kennedy, Scalia,
and Thomas, dissented on the ground that Michigan Law School’s
preferential admissions program “revealed . . . a naked effort to achieve
racial balancing.” 66 Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion, which no
other Justice joined, argued that the Court failed to scrutinize Michigan
Law School’s preferential admissions program to determine whether it
took “account of race as one, nonpredominant factor in a system
designed to consider each applicant as an individual.” 67 Instead, Justice
Kennedy agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist that “the concept of
critical mass is a delusion used by the Law School to mask its
attempt . . . to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.” 68
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, also wrote a dissenting
opinion. He thought the Court’s opinions in Grutter and Gratz v.
Bollinger69 seemed “perversely designed” to encourage future lawsuits. 70
One of these lawsuits
(50) the Black Women Lawyers Association of Greater Chicago; (51) Media Companies;
(52) Amherst, Bates, Bowdoin, Bryn Mawr, Carleton, Colby, Connecticut, Davidson,
Franklin & Marshall, Hamilton, Hampshire, Haverford, Macalester, Middlebury, Mount
Holyoke, Oberlin, Pomona, Sarah Lawrence, Smith, Swarthmore, Trinity, Vassar, Wellesley,
and Williams Colleges and Colgate, Wesleyan, and Tufts Universities; (53) Carnegie
Mellon University and 37 Fellow Private Colleges and Universities; (54) Human Rights
Advocates and the University of Minnesota Human Rights Center; (55) Michigan
Governor Jennifer M. Granholm; (55) the National Asian Pacific American Legal
Consortium, Asian Law Caucus, Asian Pacific American Legal Center et al.; (56) the
National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N’Cobra) and the National
Conference of Black Lawyers (NCBL); (57) the State of New Jersey; (58) the American
Jewish Committee, Central Conference of American Rabbis, Hadassah, National
Conference for Community and Justice, National Council of Jewish Women, Progressive
Jewish Alliance, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, and Women of Reform
Judaism, the Federation of Temple Sisterhoods; (59) Columbia, Cornell, Georgetown,
Rice, and Vanderbilt Universities; (60) Representative Richard A. Gephardt, et al.; and
(61) the Hayden Family.
65. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 379 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 389.
69. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). In this case, the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional the University of Michigan’s preferential affirmative action
program for undergraduate admissions because it used a selection method under which
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may focus on whether, in the particular setting at issue, any educational benefits
flow from racial diversity. (That issue was not contested in Grutter; and while
the [Court’s] opinion accords “a degree of deference to a university’s academic
decisions,” . . . “deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial
review” . . . .) 71

But the Court held that the issue of legislative fact that would determine
the constitutionality of Michigan Law School’s preferential admission
policies was whether any educational benefits flow from a diverse
student body. Given this holding, the Court was obligated to determine,
independently, whether educational benefits flowed from a diverse
student body, even if the parties did not raise the issue.
Justice Thomas also wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Scalia, in which he stated that “the Court relies heavily on social science
evidence to justify its deference” to the law school’s “conclusion that its
racial experimentation leads to educational benefits” 72 and cited social
science evidence to the contrary. His first reference is to a survey by
Stanley Rothman, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Neil Nevitte, 73 which
found:
[T]he greater the school’s diversity, the less students were satisfied with their
own educational experience. In addition, greater diversity was associated with
perceptions of less academic effort among students and a poorer overall educational
experience. Finally, enrollment diversity was positively related to students’
experience of unfair treatment, even after the effects of all other variables were
controlled. (As the proportion of black students grew, the incidence of these
personal grievances increased among whites. Among blacks, however, there was
no significant correlation. Thus diversity appears to increase complaints of unfair
treatment among white students without reducing them among black students.)74

every applicant from an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group was automatically
awarded twenty points of the one hundred needed to guarantee admission. This policy,
the Court held, was not narrowly tailored to achieve educational diversity. Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the Court’s opinion, which was joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas.
70. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71. Id. at 348–49 (quoting id. at 328 (majority opinion); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322, 340 (2003)).
72. Id. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. Id. See generally Stanley Rothman, Seymour Martin Lipset & Neil Nevitte,
Racial Diversity Reconsidered, PUB. INT., Spring 2003, at 25. The authors compiled a
sample totaling 1643 students, 1632 faculty members, and 808 administrators in 140
randomly selected universities and colleges in the United States. The sample excluded
historically black colleges. The Angus Reid survey research firm conducted computerassisted telephone interviews in the spring of 1999. Fifty-three percent of the students
who were contacted responded, as did seventy-two percent of the faculty and seventy
percent of the administrators. Id. at 30–31.
74. Rothman et al., supra note 73, at 36. “On the other hand, the association of
diversity with more positive faculty perceptions of the treatment of minorities, and with
both faculty and administrators’ perceptions of less campus discrimination, held true.”
Id.
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The survey of the faculty showed that “enrollment diversity was inversely
related to faculty satisfaction with the quality of education, the work
effort of the student body, and the academic readiness of students. The
administrators’ judgments of student preparation and the quality of the
educational experience were similar.” 75
Citing studies by Lamont Flowers and Ernest T. Pascarella and by
Walter R. Allen, 76 Justice Thomas then charged that the Court “never
acknowledges . . . that racial (and other sorts) of heterogeneity actually
impairs learning among black students.” 77 The Justice also “contest[ed]
the notion that the Law School’s discrimination benefits those admitted
as a result of it.” 78 He charged that the Court “spends considerable time
discussing the impressive display of amicus support for the Law School
in this case from all corners of society” but “nowhere in any of the
filings in this Court is any evidence that the purported ‘beneficiaries’ of
this racial discrimination prove themselves by performing at (or even
near) the same level as those students who receive no preferences.” 79 To
support this charge, Justice Thomas cited the work of Stephan and
Abigail Thernstrom 80 and of Thomas Sowell. 81
Justice Thomas concluded that while the beneficiaries of preferential
admissions “may graduate with law degrees, there is no evidence that
they have received a qualitatively better legal education (or become
better lawyers) than if they had gone to a less ‘elite’ law school for
which they were better prepared.” 82 He attributed the need of Michigan
75. Id.
76. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 364–65 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Walter R. Allen, The Color of Success: African-American College Student
Outcomes at Predominantly White and Historically Black Public Colleges and
Universities, 62 HARV. EDUC. REV. 26, 35 (1992); Lamont Flowers & Ernest T.
Pascarella, Cognitive Effects of College Racial Composition on African American
Students After 3 Years of College, 40 J.C. STUDENT DEV. 669, 674 (1999); see also
Louise Bohr et al., Do Black Students Learn More at Historically Black or
Predominantly White Colleges?, 36 J.C. STUDENT DEV. 75, 77–79 (1995) (finding no
significant reading, mathematics, or critical thinking test score difference between black
students educated in two historically black colleges and those educated in sixteen
predominantly white colleges).
77. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78. Id. at 371.
79. Id.
80. Id.; Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, Reflections on The Shape of
the River, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1583, 1605–08 (1999).
81. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 372 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE 176–77 (1994).
82. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 372 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Law School to discriminate on the basis of race and ethnicity to its
refusal to abandon its “elitist admissions policy” and achieve the same
racial and ethnic mix by accepting “all students who meet minimum
qualifications.” 83 Justice Thomas did not refer to any of the fifteen
amici curiae briefs that were filed in support of the petitioners who were
denied admission to Michigan Law School. 84
To perform their gatekeeping function under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 and come to independent conclusions about constitutional
legislative facts that are in dispute, courts should be expected to take
account of all the data that are available and material for a determination
of these facts. Yet Justice O’Connor’s opinion made no mention of the
studies relied upon by Justice Thomas or any of the amici curiae briefs
that supported his position. Nor did Justice Thomas attempt to evaluate the
methodology or conclusions of the social science studies relied upon by
Justice O’Connor or any of the amici curiae briefs that supported the
position of Michigan Law School. Each Justice was content with citing
only the studies that supported his or her conclusions. But because the
Court held that only the educational benefits flowing from a diverse
student body could constitutionally justify Michigan Law School’s
preferential racial and ethnic admissions policies, it was obligated to be
as certain as possible that a diverse student body produced the claimed
benefits. At a minimum, Justices O’Connor and Thomas should have
acknowledged the existence of the social science data and analyses that
failed to support their positions and explained why they rejected these
data and analyses. Consideration of the conflicting data and analyses
bearing upon whether student body diversity produces educational
benefits for minority, as well as nonminority, students indicates how
difficult a task was presented to the Supreme Court, both substantively and
procedurally. 85
83. Id. at 350, 361–62, 354–56 n.4.
84. Briefs were filed by (1) the United States; (2) twenty-one law professors;
(3) Ward Connerly; (4) the National Association of Scholars; (5) the Pacific Legal
Foundation; (6) the Asian American Legal Foundation; (7) the Cato Institute; (8) the
Center for Equal Opportunity, the Independent Women’s Forum, and the American Civil
Rights Institute; (9) the Center for Individual Freedom; (10) the Claremont Institute
Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence; (11) the Center for the Advancement of
Capitalism; (12) the Michigan Association of Scholars; (13) the State of Florida and
Governor John Ellis “Jeb” Bush; (14) the Reason Foundation; and (15) the Center for
New Black Leadership.
At least six briefs were submitted supporting neither of the parties in Grutter,
specifically those by (1) the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation; (2) the Massachusetts
School of Law; (3) Exxon Mobil Corporation; (4) BP America Incorporated; (5) the
Anti-Defamation League; and (6) the Equal Employment Advisory Council.
85. For the following delineation of the controversy, I am indebted, generally, to
Brian N. Lizotte, The Diversity Rationale: Unprovable, Uncompelling, 11 MICH. J. RACE
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Justice O’Connor placed principal reliance upon William G. Bowen
and Derek Bok’s book 86 and the amicus curiae brief of the American
Educational Research Association and others, which, in turn, relied upon
the Expert Report of Professor Patricia Gurin. In the federal district
court, Bowen testified for the University of Michigan in Gratz, Bok
testified for the University of Michigan Law School in Grutter, and
Gurin testified in both Gratz and Grutter. 87
Bowen and Bok concluded that admission to selective undergraduate
and professional schools “pays off handsomely for individuals of all
races, from all backgrounds.”88 Black students who attended these schools
were five times as likely as all black students nationwide to earn professional
degrees or Ph.D.s. Approximately forty percent of the black students in
the 1976 entering classes went on to obtain professional or doctoral
degrees. The comparable figure for white students in these schools was
thirty-seven percent and for all black college graduates, eight percent. 89
Blacks from elite colleges and universities were also far more likely than
their white classmates to attend the most selective and prestigious law,
medical, and business schools. 90
Attendance at these institutions “conferred a considerable premium
[earning appreciably more money than students with comparable
academic achievement who attended less selective schools] . . . and

& L. 625 (2006) and Russell K. Nieli, The Changing Shape of the River: Affirmative
Action and Recent Social Science Research, ACAD. QUESTIONS, Fall 2004, at 7.
86. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998).
Bowen and Bok
used the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation’s College and Beyond [C & B]
database to [survey black] students who had enrolled in 28 elite colleges and
universities, 70% at one of 24 private universities, and the other 30% at one of
four large public schools. . . . [S]tudents were surveyed first in 1976, and
again in 1989 [about their] advanced degree attainment, employment, earnings,
job satisfaction, civic participation, and views on race relations.
Lizotte, supra note 85, at 635.
The C & B database was “[c]reated on the explicit understanding that the Foundation
would not release or publish data that identified either individual students or individual
schools, it is a ‘restricted access database.’” BOWEN & BOK, supra, at xxviii. This
should have raised questions under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
87. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 850 (2001); Gratz v. Bollinger, 122
F. Supp. 2d 811, 822, 830 (2000).
88. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 86, at 276.
89. Id. at 98 fig.4.2.
90. Id. at 102 fig.4.4.
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probably an especially high premium on black students.” 91 On average,
black men earned $38,200—or eighty-two percent—more than all black
men with Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) degrees, and black women earned
$27,200—or seventy-three percent—more than all black women with
B.A. degrees. The earnings advantage of white students attending selective
institutions vis-à-vis all white holders of B.A.s was fifty-five percent for
women and sixty-one percent for men.
Bowen and Bok hailed the success in college and later life of the black
students who were the beneficiaries of the preferential admissions
policies of the twenty-eight elite institutions. 92 These beneficiaries
formed “the backbone of the emergent black and Hispanic middle class,”
were active in civic affairs, and played leadership roles within the black
community and the larger society. 93
If preferential admissions were eliminated in schools of law and
medicine, Bowen and Bok maintained, more than half of the existing
minority student population would be excluded from these professions. 94
“Considering both the educational benefits of diversity and the need to
include far larger numbers of black graduates in the top ranks of the
business, professional, governmental, and not-for-profit institutions that
shape our society,” they concluded that society would not be better off if
preferential admissions were eliminated. 95
In their review of the Bowen and Bok book cited by Justice Thomas,
Abigail and Stephan Thernstrom sought to refute Bowen and Bok at
every point. They attributed the success of black graduates of the twentyeight elite institutions in gaining admission to graduate and professional
schools to the fact that these schools also engaged in preferential
admissions policies, 96 which Bowen and Bok acknowledged. 97
Bowen and Bok also do not dispute that the beneficiaries of
preferential admissions “underperform” in the classroom. “The average
rank of black [1989] matriculants [in the twenty-eight elite institutions]
was at the 23d percentile of the class, the average Hispanic student
ranked in the 36th percentile, and the average white student ranked in the
53d percentile.”98 They attribute these results to the minority matriculants’
“struggles to succeed academically in highly competitive academic

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
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settings.” 99 Justice Thomas agreed and the Thernstroms elaborate this
point. They cite the work of Linda F. Wightman, who reported that
more than a fifth of the black law students who were the beneficiaries of
preferential admissions failed to graduate and that disproportionate
numbers of African American law graduates failed the bar examinations,
which are graded on a color-blind basis. 100 Of the African American
law graduates, twenty-seven percent
were unable to pass a bar exam within three years of graduation, a failure rate
nearly triple that for African Americans who were admitted under regular
standards and almost seven times the white failure rate. Fully 43% of the black
students admitted to law school on the basis of race fell by the wayside, either
dropping out without a degree or failing to pass a bar examination. 101

The Thernstroms also challenge the Bowen and Bok claim that the
beneficiaries of preferential affirmative action policies in the elite
colleges and universities “are the backbone of the emergent black and
Hispanic middle class.” 102 They say that The Shape of the River “does
not contain a shred of evidence about the impact of preferential policies
upon Hispanics” and estimate the number of African American
beneficiaries at 4000—“a group too minuscule to form the ‘backbone’ of
a black middle class that by any reasonable definition includes more than
ten million people.” 103 Furthermore, the African American beneficiaries
generally come from middle class black families. 104 Nor, they maintain,
are Bowen and Bok correct in implying that preferential admissions to
elite institutions are responsible for the advances of African Americans
since World War II. 105 Very few of the increased number of African
Americans in Congress, the federal government, the federal judiciary,
99. Id.
100. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1611–12; see also Linda F.
Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the
Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 36 (1997). Wightman calculated that of the more than 27,000 students
entering 163 American Bar Association (ABA) approved law schools in the fall of 1991,
“only twenty-four African Americans would have been admitted to any of the top
eighteen law schools if the decisions had been made purely on the basis of college grades
and LSAT scores. But thanks to preferences, 420 black students got in, a stunning 17.5
times as many.” Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1610; see also Wightman,
supra, at 30 tbl.6.
101. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1612.
102. Id. at 1617 (quoting BOWEN & BOK, supra note 86, at 116).
103. Id. at 1617–18.
104. Id. at 1618.
105. Id.; see BOWEN & BOK, supra note 86, at 1–3.
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the armed forces and academia, or of the recipients of the MacArthur
Foundation “genius” awards, attended elite institutions.106
The Threnstroms also reject Bowen and Bok’s contention that
preferential admissions are responsible for a cadre of African Americans
who are making an indispensable contribution to civic and community
endeavors. As Bowen and Bok concede, the rate (ninety percent) of the
African American elite college students who participated in one or more
civic activities is almost identical (eighty-seven percent) to that found in
their survey of a nationally representative control group of matriculants
at four-year colleges. 107
Bowen and Bok also found that black students at elite schools tend to
be somewhat more active than their white classmates, both as participants
and as leaders, in one or more of thirteen types of civic activities. 108 The
Thernstroms ask:
But how can we be sure they would have been any less active at a less selective
college? The high level of participation Bowen and Bok discovered may simply
reflect the fact that the admissions officers at the [elite] schools placed a heavy
premium on prior organizational activity, particularly for minority applicants
whose academic credentials were weaker. 109

Bowen and Bok view the elite schools they studied as models for race
relations they hope the larger society will emulate and claim that
preferential admissions are essential to that mission. Their survey data,
they maintain, “throw new light on the extent of interaction occurring on
campuses today” and reveal “how positively the great majority of students
regard opportunities to learn from those with different points of view,
backgrounds, and experiences.” 110 As evidence, they report that fifty-six
percent of the white students in their 1989 cohort said that they knew
two or more black classmates “well” and that eighty-eight percent of
blacks knew at least two white classmates “well.” 111
The Thernstroms reply that eighty-six percent of all white adults in a
1997 national survey said they had black friends, and fifty-four percent
of whites reported having five or more. 112 Nationally, seventy-three
percent of whites surveyed in 1994 said that “they had ‘good friends’
who were African American. And the proportion of blacks with white
friends is higher still on every one of these national surveys. The Bowen
and Bok survey [according to the Thernstroms] suggests that the elite
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
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campuses may be in the rear guard, not the vanguard.” 113 But are the
two surveys comparable? There is a big difference between a student
knowing someone in his or her class well and having friends of a
different race.
Bowen and Bok report that former students at the elite institutions,
both black and white, said they appreciated studying in a racially diverse
environment and wished their colleges placed even more emphasis on
racial diversity. 114 The Thernstroms think this is “hardly surprising”
since administrations and much of the faculty at these schools have
“strenuously celebrated” diversity on their campuses.115 They also
conclude that “given the prevailing campus climate, it is remarkable that
enthusiasm for diversity was as limited as it turned out to be.” 116 To
support their conclusion, the Thernstroms turned to the Bowen and Bok
survey, which asked students in the elite institutions to rate the
importance of the “ability to ‘work effectively and get along well with
people of different races/cultures?’” 117 “Only 42% of the white students
in the 1976 cohort and 55% of the 1989 group said, ‘very important,’
while the figure for blacks was 74% in 1976, 76% in 1989.” 118 The
Thernstroms do not think these figures suggest that “elite campuses are a
national race relations model.” 119 Bowen and Bok did not ask students
who attended less selective schools to respond to the same question.
Nor did they ask students in the elite institutions whether they approved
or disapproved of preferential admissions. 120
Bowen and Bok made much of the “considerable premium” enjoyed
by both black and white students who attended elite institutions. The
Thernstroms did not deal with this issue, but the work of Stephen Cole
and Elinor Barber casts doubt on the Bowen and Bok assumption that
this premium would disappear for black students if preferential
admissions were abandoned. 121 Cole and Barber estimate that the
113. Id.
114. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 86, at 247–48, 280.
115. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1622.
116. Id.
117. Id.; BOWEN & BOK, supra note 86, at 224 tbl.8.1.
118. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1622–23; BOWEN & BOK, supra
note 86, at 224 tbl.8.1.
119. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1623.
120. Id.
121. STEPHEN COLE & ELINOR BARBER, INCREASING FACULTY DIVERSITY: THE
OCCUPATIONAL CHOICES OF HIGH-ACHIEVING MINORITY STUDENTS 206 (2003). This
work was based on the results of an extensive questionnaire filled out by 7612 graduating
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hundred most elite colleges and universities turn out about four percent
of the 100,000 B.A. degrees received annually by black students, and
more than 2500 four-year institutions turn out ninety-six percent. 122
“The data we present,” they write, “would . . . suggest that these 4,000
students would end up in higher-prestige occupations than they do under
the current system of racial preferences in admissions.” 123 In coming to
this conclusion, Cole and Barber accepted the fact that most of the
studies by economists “show a small but significant positive effect on
income of attending a prestigious school.” 124 But these same studies
“also show that GPA has a small statistically significant negative effect
on outcomes such as earnings—an effect that is usually at least as large
as the effect of attending a highly selective school.” 125 And since
“admissions policies employing racial preferences result in African
Americans receiving lower GPAs than they might if they attended
somewhat less selective schools, it seems to us that abandoning racial
preferences would have little or no effect on outcomes such as income or
prestige of occupation entered.” 126
A study by economists Stacy Berg Dale and Alan B. Krueger 127
disputed The Shape of the River’s central contention on this issue: that
attending an elite school has a significant positive effect on income—a
contention Cole and Barber did not dispute. Dale and Krueger showed
that what “may appear to be an independent school effect” may be “a
simple reflection of the fact that people who attend the most selective
colleges often have qualities [‘important personal motivational factors’
and other personal attributes] that . . . make them more likely to succeed
financially and occupationally regardless of the institutions they
attend.” 128 They found that students who attend more selective colleges
do not earn more than other students who were accepted by the selective
colleges but chose to attend less selective ones. 129
Like Cole and Barber, Dale and Krueger found that black and
Hispanic students attending elite institutions because of preferential

seniors at thirty-four colleges and universities, most of which were considerably above
the national norm in selectivity.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Stacy Berg Dale & Alan B. Krueger, Estimating the Payoff to Attending a
More Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables,
117 Q.J. ECON. 1491, 1524 (2002).
128. Nieli, supra note 85, at 10; see also Dale & Krueger, supra note 127, at 1523–
24.
129. Dale & Krueger, supra note 127, at 1523.

56

AUERBACH POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC

[VOL. 45: 33, 2008]

4/22/2008 1:20:38 PM

Legislative Facts in Grutter v. Bollinger
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

admissions do not do as well academically as their white and Asian
classmates with the same SAT scores. Black and Hispanic students
with the same SAT scores who attend less selective colleges earn
relatively higher grades and attain higher rank in class than they do.
“Employers and graduate schools may value their higher rank by
enough to offset any other effect of attending a less selective college
on earnings.” 130 These researchers, as well as the Thernstroms,
attribute this “underperformance” of black and Hispanic students to the
academic “mismatch” between them and their white and Asian
classmates. 131 This is the explanation for “underperformance” accepted
by Justice Thomas who also cited the work of Thomas Sowell in
support of it. 132
Bowen and Bok attack the mismatch theory by showing that the more
selective the school, the greater the likelihood that black students in
the school will graduate. 133 But the Thernstroms reply that it is hard
to flunk out of the elite schools which practice grade inflation.
According to Bowen and Bok’s 1989 sample, only 6.3% of the white
students but 20.8% of the African American students failed to get a
bachelor’s degree. And the racial difference in the dropout rate widened
as the selectivity of the school increased—as the mismatch theory would
suggest. 134
Professors Claude M. Steele and Joshua Aronson attribute this
underperformance to what they call “stereotype threat” 135 and other
social scientists, “stereotype vulnerability.” They argue:

130. Id. at 1512.
131. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1601–02.
132. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 372 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing SOWELL, supra note 81, at 176–77).
133. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 86, at 61 fig.3.3.
134. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1603–04.
135. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Test
Performance of Academically Successful African Americans, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST
SCORE GAP 401, 401 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998); see also
Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker & Sarah E. Redfield, Law Schools Cannot Be Effective in
Isolation, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 61 (using the term stereotype vulnerability).
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African American students know that any faltering [on standardized tests] could
cause them to be seen through the lens of a negative racial stereotype [about
their intellectual ability as a group]. Those whose self-regard is predicated on
high achievement—usually the stronger, more confident students—may feel
this pressure so greatly that it disrupts and undermines their test
performance. 136

Stereotype threat “may interfere with performance in several ways”
because the emotional arousal that accompanies it “can reduce the range
of cues that students use to solve test problems. It can divert attention
from the task at hand to irrelevant worries. It can also cause selfconsciousness or overcautiousness.” 137 Cole and Barber conclude there
is evidence to support Claude Steele’s theory. 138
Although The Shape of the River provoked the most controversy, it
did not deal directly with the educational benefits said to flow from
student body diversity that provided Justice O’Connor’s constitutional
justification for preferential racial and ethnic admissions. On the issue
of educational benefits flowing from diversity, Justice O’Connor relied
upon Professor Gurin’s Expert Report, 139 which was also the basis of the
amicus brief submitted by the American Educational Research Association,
the Association of American Colleges and Universities, and the
American Association for Higher Education, which the Justice also cited
in her opinion.
In her Expert Report, Professor Gurin analyzed (1) national data
collected through the Cooperative Institutional Research Program
(CIRP), which is conducted by the UCLA Higher Education Research
Institute under the auspices of the American Council on Education; 140
(2) surveys by the Michigan Student Study (MSS); 141 and (3) a survey of
136. Steele & Aronson, supra note 135, at 402.
137. Id. at 404.
138. COLE & BARBER, supra note 121, at 138.
139. See generally Expert Witness Report of Patricia Y. Gurin, supra note 45.
140. CIRP had 9316 students attending 184 colleges and universities complete
questionnaires when they entered college in the summer and early fall of 1985 and
follow-up questionnaires in 1989 and 1994 to assess their experiences since entering
college. Historically black colleges and universities and community colleges were
excluded from Professor Gurin’s analysis. Expert Witness Report of Patricia Y. Gurin,
supra note 45, at app. C, available at http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/
expert/gurinapc.html.
141. The MSS was a longitudinal series of surveys of the undergraduate class of
1994. All students received a questionnaire when they entered the University in September
1990. All students of color and a large representative sample of white students were
followed up with questionnaires at the end of their first year, second year, and senior
year of college. The data analyses presented in the Expert Report were based on the
responses of 1134 white students and 187 African American students. The data on
Latino students were not analyzed because their number at Michigan was not large
enough to permit reliable results from the multivariate analyses undertaken. Id.
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students [Gurin does not state how many] who entered the University of
Michigan in 1990 and, as freshmen, took an introductory course in the
Intergroup Relations, Community and Conflict Program (IGRCC). 142
The “diversity” that the Court justified is what Professor Gurin and
other social scientists refer to as “structural diversity”—the “numerical
and proportional representation of students from different racial/ethnic
groups in the student body.” 143 Gurin insists that structural diversity, by
itself, usually is “not sufficient to produce substantial benefits.” 144 Yet it
is essential because it makes possible “classroom diversity”—the
incorporation into the curriculum of knowledge about diverse groups
and interracial ethnic relationships and the opportunity of students from
diverse backgrounds to learn about each other in the courses they take
together—and “informal interactional diversity,” which is ”the opportunity
to interact with students from diverse backgrounds [on campus] . . . .” 145
Only classroom and interactional diversity, according to Gurin, produces
educational benefits. 146
Forty percent of Michigan’s African American students, thirty-five
percent of its white students, and about twenty-five percent of its Asian
American students indicated they had “quite a bit” or “a great deal” of

142. An evaluation study followed these students for four years. All students in the
program attended lectures, participated in discussion groups, wrote papers and exams,
and engaged in a ten-week dialogue group designed to:
(1) help students discern and understand differences and similarities between
the groups’ viewpoints on contested issues, (2) examine differences in
viewpoint within each of the two groups in the dialogue, (3) help students
identify and negotiate conflicts that arise in the dialogue, and (4) challenge the
groups to find a basis for coalition and joint action on a specific issue.
Id. Students were surveyed first with students in the MSS study, again after the IGRCC
program was completed, and three years later at graduation. The study utilized a
matched-sample control group of students who had not enrolled in the IGRCC program.
Id.
143. Jeffrey F. Milem, The Educational Benefits Of Diversity: Evidence From
Multiple Sectors, in COMPELLING INTEREST: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE OF RACIAL
DYNAMICS IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 126, 132 (Mitchell J. Chang et al. eds., 2003).
Milem describes a second type of diversity as “diversity-related initiatives (i.e., cultural
awareness workshops, ethnic studies courses, and so forth) that occur on college and
university campuses,” even those that are not structurally diverse. Id. He describes a
third type of diversity as “diverse interactions” that are “characterized by students’
exchanges with racially and ethnically diverse people as well as diverse ideas,
information, and experiences.” Id.
144. Expert Witness Report of Patricia Y. Gurin, supra note 45, at 377.
145. Id. at 376.
146. Id. at 376–77.
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exposure to diversity content in their courses.147 Forty percent of Michigan’s
white students indicated having “substantial” interaction with Asian
American students and another forty percent indicated having “some”
interaction. Twenty percent of the white students indicated having
“substantial” interaction with African American students and another
forty-five percent indicated having “some” interaction. 148 Ninety-one
percent of the Latino students, eighty-six percent of the Asian American
students, and fifty percent of the African American students indicated
“substantial” interactions with white students. 149
Describing the nature of these interactions, thirty-nine percent of the
white students said they “studied together” with Latino students “quite a
bit” or “a great deal” and sixty-eight percent said they “shared personal
feelings and problems” in these relationships. The comparable percentages
of white student interactions with Asian American students were thirtyeight percent and forty-nine percent, respectively, and with African American
students, fourteen percent and twenty-nine percent, respectively. Only
four percent of the white students said they “had tense, somewhat hostile
interactions” with African American students, and only one percent said
these relationships were “guarded and cautious.”
Seventy-three percent of the Latino students, sixty-seven percent of
the Asian American students, and twenty-six percent of the African
American students said they “studied together” with white students
“quite a bit” or “a great deal”; eighty-five percent of the Latino students,
seventy percent of the Asian American students, and twenty-five percent
of the African American students, said they “shared personal feelings
and problems” in these relationships. 150 Twenty-three percent of the
African American students said their relationships with white students
were “guarded and cautious,” and fifteen percent indicated that they
were “tense, somewhat hostile.” 151
The proportion of white students who had at least one close friend of
color among their six best friends increased from thirty-two percent at
the time they entered the University of Michigan to forty-six percent
four years later. African American students with at least one close friend
who was not African American increased from forty-seven percent at
time of entrance to fifty-four percent when they were seniors. 152

147. Expert Witness Report of Patricia Y. Gurin, supra note 45, at app. E, available
at http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/expert/gurinape.html.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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On the basis of these data, Gurin concluded that the University of
Michigan, which was structurally diverse with about twenty-five percent
minority enrollment, “is one of those institutions that has created
opportunities in classes and in the informal student environment for
structural diversity to affect student learning and preparation for
participation in a democratic society.” 153 Gurin found “[s]tudents who
had experienced the most diversity in classroom settings and in informal
interactions with peers showed the greatest engagement in active
thinking processes, growth in intellectual engagement and motivation,
and growth in intellectual and academic skills.” 154 They employed
“conscious, effortful, deep thinking,” in contrast to thinking that is
preconditioned or stereotyped, thus enabling them to better understand
others’ perspectives and manage conflicts. The results showed:
White students with the most experience with diversity during college
demonstrated the greatest growth in active thinking processes as indicated by
increased scores on the measures of complex thinking and social/historical
thinking . . . ; growth in motivation in terms of drive to achieve, intellectual
self-confidence, goals for creating original works . . . ; the highest post-graduate
degree aspirations . . . ; and the greatest growth in . . . values [students] placed
on their intellectual and academic skills . . . . 155

These results persisted over time.
Five years into the post-college world, white graduates who had experienced the
greatest classroom diversity and informal interactional diversity during college
still demonstrated the strongest academic motivation and the greatest growth in
learning . . . . They also placed greater value than other white graduates on
intellectual and academic skills as part of their post-college lives . . . . 156

The results from the Michigan Student Society show that it is the quality
of cross-racial interaction that “affects white students’ growth in active
thinking and their graduate school intentions.” 157
On the basis of the CIRP data, Gurin found that attending a structurally
diverse college resulted in more diverse friends, neighbors, and work
associates nine years after college entry. 158 White students raised in
predominantly white neighborhoods “who attended colleges with 25
percent or more minority enrollment, as contrasted to white students who
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Expert Witness Report of Patricia Y. Gurin, supra note 45, at 377.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 389.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 385.
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attended colleges with very low minority enrollment, were much more
likely to have diverse friendships after leaving college and to live in
diverse neighborhoods and work in settings where co-workers were
diverse.” 159 Moreover, due to the networking they were able to do in
structurally diverse schools, previously segregated minority students in
such schools were “more likely to find themselves in desegregated
employment and to work in white-collar and professional jobs in the
private sector.” 160
Students who had attended diverse colleges were also better prepared
to participate in a democratic society. Gurin described these “democracy
outcomes” as follows:
Education plays a foundational role in a democracy by equipping students for
meaningful participation. Students educated in diverse settings are more
motivated and better able to participate in an increasingly heterogeneous and
complex democracy. They are better able to understand and consider multiple
perspectives, deal with the conflicts that different perspectives sometimes
create, and appreciate the common values and integrative forces that harness
differences in pursuit of the common good. Students can best develop a capacity to
understand the ideas and feelings of others in an environment characterized by
the presence of diverse others, equality among peers, and discussion under rules
of civil discourse. These factors are present on a campus with a racially diverse
student body.
. . . Students who experienced diversity in classroom settings and in informal
interactions showed the most engagement during college in various forms of
citizenship, and the most engagement with people from different races and
cultures. . . . These effects continued after the students left the university
setting. Diversity experiences during college had impressive effects on the
extent to which graduates in the [CIRP] national study were living racially and
ethnically integrated lives in the post-college world. Students with the most
diversity experiences during college had the most cross-racial interactions five
years after leaving college. 161

Justice O’Connor cited two other works which, on the whole, support
Professor Gurin’s Expert Report. 162 Professor Mitchell J. Chang’s study
showed that structural diversity is “a significant, though not strong,
positive predictor of students’ likelihood of forming interracial
friendships and talking about race and ethnicity.” 163 Socializing with

159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 386.
Id.
Id. at 365–66.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (citing DIVERSITY CHALLENGED:
EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (Gary Orfield & Michal Kurlaender
eds., 2001); COMPELLING INTEREST, supra note 143).
163. Mitchell J. Chang, The Positive Educational Effects of Racial Diversity on
Campus, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED, supra note 162, at 175, 181. Professor Chang
analyzed a 1985 survey completed by 192,453 first-time, full-time freshmen at 365
colleges and universities and a 1989 survey of a sample of the 1985 respondents
completed by 18,188 students attending 392 colleges and universities to ascertain
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someone of another racial group and talking about racial issues were
positively related to academic and personal development—to earning a
bachelor’s or higher degree, intellectual self-confidence, social selfconfidence, and overall satisfaction with college. Professor Chang
acknowledged that the statistical correlations found in his study were
relatively small, but insisted they were significant, “not simply in the
mathematical sense but also because they exist at all,” in refutation of
the critics of preferential affirmative action.
Professor Sylvia Hurtado’s analysis 164 concluded that “[p]erhaps the
most compelling argument for a diverse student body rests on evidence
showing that interaction across racial/ethnic groups, particularly of an
academic nature, is associated with important outcomes [including
improvement in critical thinking and problem-solving skills] that will
prepare students for living in a complex and diverse society.” 165
Professor Jeffrey F. Milem found that the institutions that “made the
most progress in increasing the enrollment of minority students—the
selective research universities—are in many respects the least flexible
and least adaptive in responding to changing student needs. These
institutions are dominated by faculty oriented to specialized research, not
to flexible approaches to teaching.” 166 He agreed with Professor Gurin
that “simply admitting more minority students does not produce the
substantial changes in teaching approaches or content necessary to realize
the full benefits of diversity. Such changes do take place, however,
where there is increased faculty diversity and leadership that alters the
campus climate.” 167 So the failure of an institution to adapt to the needs

whether student socialization with someone of a different race and discussion of racial
issues were a function of racial and ethnic diversity on campus. Id. at 177.
164. Sylvia Hurtado, Linking Diversity and Educational Purpose: How Diversity
Affects the Classroom Environment and Student Development, in DIVERSITY
CHALLENGED, supra note 162, at 187, 187. Professor Hurtado analyzed the self-reported
experiences of a random national sample of approximately 4250 students attending 309
four-year predominantly white colleges and universities in the late 1980s to the early
1990s, and data from the 1989–1990 Faculty Survey administered by UCLA’s Higher
Education Research Institute, composed of responses from over 16,000 faculty at 159
medium and highly selective predominantly white institutions across the United States.
Id. at 192.
165. Id. at 199–200.
166. Jeffrey F. Milem, Increasing Diversity Benefits: How Campus Climate and
Teaching Methods Affect Student Outcomes, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED, supra note 162,
at 233, 234.
167. Id. at 234. The campus climate is formed by:
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of the minority students, not preferential affirmative action, should be
blamed if student body diversity does not produce the expected
educational benefits.
Professor Milem also reviewed the literature dealing with the
educational benefits of structural diversity in the third book cited by
Justice O’Connor. 168 Milem concluded that current research supports
the view that diversity benefits all students by enhancing their critical
and complex thinking ability, attaining higher levels of social and
historical thinking, enhancing ability to understand diverse perspectives,
improving openness to diversity and challenge, enhancing classroom
discussions, producing greater satisfaction with their college experience,
attaining higher levels of student persistence, improving racial and
cultural awareness, producing greater commitment to increasing racial
understanding, perceiving a more supportive campus racial climate, and
increasing income of those who graduate from higher institutions of
“quality.” 169
Current research, according to Milem, also supports the conclusion
that diversity produces more student-centered approaches to teaching
and learning, more diverse curricular offerings, more research focused
on issues of race, ethnicity, and gender, and more involvement in
community and volunteer service on the part of women faculty and
faculty of color.
Of all the studies referred to by the Court in support of its conclusions
in Grutter, only three principal works dealt with law students and law
schools. The first was the amicus brief of the Association of American
Law Schools, which showed that law schools, especially the elite
schools, trained the nation’s leaders.170 The second, a study by Professors
Gary Orfield and Dean Whitla, explored the educational impact of
student diversity in Harvard Law School and the University of Michigan
Law School and supported the findings of Professor Gurin’s Expert
Report. 171 The third, a study by Professors Richard Lempert, David

1) an institution’s historical legacy of inclusion or exclusion of various racial
or ethnic groups; 2) structural diversity, or the numerical and proportional
representation of diverse groups on campus; 3) the psychological climate,
including perceptions and attitudes between groups; and 4) the behavioral
climate, or nature of intergroup relations on campus.
Id.
168. Milem, supra note 143, at 126.
169. Id. at 130.
170. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
171. Gary Orfield & Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: Student
Experiences in Leading Law Schools, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED, supra note 162, at
143, 154. Their data consisted of the responses of 1820 students at Harvard and
Michigan to a survey administered by the Gallup Poll.
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Chambers, and Terry Adams, 172 surveyed more than two thousand
Michigan Law School alumni, half of whom were minorities, who had
graduated between 1970 and 1996. Their conclusions also supported the
findings of The Shape of the River and Professor Gurin’s Expert Report.
Two-thirds of the students surveyed by Orfield and Whitla were white.
Fifty-five percent of the Harvard students and sixty percent of the
Michigan students reported high levels of interracial contact. 173 About
one-third of the students in the two schools said they studied together
with students of a different race or ethnicity “often” or “fairly often.” 174
More than two-thirds of the students in each school thought diversity led
to an enhancement of their thinking about problems and solutions and
the way topics were discussed inside and outside their classes, and of
their ability to work effectively and get along with members of other
races. 175
Approximately ninety-two percent of the Harvard students and almost
ninety-four percent of the Michigan students said that discussions with
students of different racial and ethnic backgrounds changed their views
of conditions in various social and economic institutions. 176 Equally
large percentages said that such discussions changed their views of civil
rights and the kind of legal or community issues they will encounter as
professionals. 177
Students were asked to compare their classes that were attended by
members of one race only with their classes that were racially or
ethnically diverse, with respect to the variety of subjects and examples
considered, the level of intellectual challenge, and the seriousness with
which alternative perspectives were discussed. Among the students who
attended both types of classes, those who stated that the diverse classes
were superior in these respects outnumbered by more than ten to one
those who stated that the single-race classes were superior. But the
percentage perceiving no difference in the level of intellectual challenge

172. Richard O. Lempert, David L. Chambers & Terry K. Adams, Michigan’s
Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 395 (2000).
173. Orfield & Whitla, supra note 171, at 158.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 159.
176. Id. at 164–65.
177. Id. at 165–66.
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between the two types of classes (36.8%) was slightly greater than the
percentage finding the diverse classes superior in this respect (34.4%). 178
Finally, students were asked: “Do you consider having students of
different races and ethnicities to be a positive or negative element of
your educational experience?” 179 Approximately ninety percent of the
Harvard and Michigan students replied that diversity was a positive
element in their total educational experience. 180 Rothman, Lipset, and
Nevitte maintain that this last question asked by Orfield and Whitla is
worded in a way that taps into issues on which almost everyone
agrees. 181 “[A]lmost everyone approves of [diversity] in the abstract,
but its application in concrete situations can produce great
controversy.” 182
The Lempert, Chambers, and Adams survey concluded:
Perhaps the core finding of our study is that Michigan’s minority alumni,
who enter law school with lower LSAT scores and UGPAs than its white
alumni and receive, on average, lower grades in law school than their white
counterparts, appear highly successful—fully as successful as Michigan’s white
alumni—when success is measured by self-reported career satisfaction or
contributions to the community. Controlling for gender and career length, they
are also as successful when success is measured by income. 183

They found that large proportions of alumni placed considerable value
on the contribution diversity made to their classroom experiences.
Nearly twice as many white male alumni who graduated in the 1990s,
when student body diversity was increasing, responded positively to
diversity than white males graduating in each of the previous two
decades. They also found that minority alumni were more likely than
other alumni to engage in government and public interest work and to
serve individuals of their own race or ethnicity.
A survey of 500 law school faculty conducted by the American
Association of Law Schools (AALS) in 1999 was also available to the
Court. 184 The AALS found that faculty supported structural diversity
because it broadened the variety of experiences shared in the classroom
and helped students to confront racial stereotypes. Nearly seventy-five

178. Id. at 166–67.
179. Id. at 161.
180. Id. at 160–61.
181. Rothman et al., supra note 73, at 30.
182. Id.
183. Lempert et al., supra note 172, at 496–97.
184. The results of the AALS survey were set forth in the amicus brief submitted by
the American Educational Research Association and others, which was cited by Justice
O’Connor in Grutter. Brief of the American Educational Research Ass’n et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 19, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No.
02-241).
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percent of the faculty, AALS reported, felt strongly that having a diverse
student body is important to their law schools’ mission. 185
Subsequent to the decision in Grutter, Richard H. Sander, Professor of
Law at UCLA and a Ph.D. in economics, published a study of the effects
of preferential admissions programs in law schools nationally on African
Americans seeking to enter the legal profession. 186 Using a 1000-point
scale that gave 400 points for a perfect undergraduate GPA and 600
points for a perfect LSAT score, Professor Sander found that at the
fourteen most elite law schools, white students had a median score of
875 (equivalent to, for example, an undergraduate GPA of 3.75 and an
LSAT score of 170) while black students had a median score of 705
(equivalent to, for example, an undergraduate GPA of 3.05 and an LSAT
score of 160). The median black score was 2.3 standard deviations
below the median white score.
Preferential admissions to the elite law schools, Sander asserts, forces
all other law schools to follow the same practice if they wish, as they do,
to enroll any black students. Sander explains:
Affirmative action . . . has a cascading effect through American legal
education. The use of large boosts for black applicants at the top law schools
means that the highest-scoring blacks are almost entirely absorbed by the
highest tier. Schools in the next tier have no choice but to either enroll very few
blacks or use racial boosts or segregated admissions tracks to the same degree as
the top-tier schools. The same pattern continues all the way down the hierarchy.
. . . At the bulk of law schools, the very large preferences granted to blacks
only exist in order to offset the effects of preferences used by higher-ranked
schools.
....
. . . The result is a game of musical chairs where blacks are consistently
bumped up several seats in the law school hierarchy, producing a large blackwhite gap in the academic credentials of students at nearly all law schools. 187

Supporting the contentions of the Thernstroms, Cole and Barber, Dale
and Krueger, and Thomas Sowell, Sander shows that the “cascading
effect” of preferential admissions of blacks puts many of them in
academic environments that are too competitive for them. The Law
185. Id.
186. Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 369 (2004). Professor Sander analyzed several large
databases, including the Bar Passage Study (BPS) compiled from 1991 to 1997 by the
Law School Admissions Council. These data track the progress of more than 27,000
students from when they entered law school in 1991 until 1997. Id. at 414–15.
187. Id. at 416–19.
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School Admissions Council-Bar Passage Study (LSAC-BPS) data
revealed that at the top tier of law schools, fifty-two percent of blacks,
compared to six percent of whites, had first year grades that placed them
in the bottom ten percent of the grade distribution, and only eight
percent of the blacks placed in the top half of their class. The median
African American student at these schools received the same first year
grades as the fifth or sixth percentile white student.
In the second, third, fourth, and fifth groups of law schools identified
in the LSAC-BPS data, the patterns of black performance were similar:
Generally, around fifty percent of black students are in the bottom tenth of the
class, and around two-thirds of black students are in the bottom fifth. . . . Only
in Group 6, made up of the seven historically minority law schools, is the
credentials gap, and the performance gap, much smaller. 188

At the 163 law schools surveyed, Professor Sander found that the
median black GPA at the end of the first year was equivalent to those of
whites at the seventh or eighth percentile, that is, about ninety-two
percent of white students did better than the median black student. And
the black students do not tend to catch up with the white students in the
second and third years of law school. “In relative terms, the grades of
black law students actually go down a little from the first to the third
year.” 189
As a result, the attrition rate of black students is more than twice that
of whites: 19.2% of blacks failed to graduate after five years in law
school as compared to 8.2% of whites. 190 Black students who graduate
face the bar exam, the final hurdle to entry into the legal profession.
Sander reports:
Of all the black students in the LSAC-BPS study who began law school in 1991,
only 45% graduated from law school, took the bar, and passed on their first
attempt. The rate for whites was over 78%. After multiple attempts, 57% of the
original black cohort become lawyers. But this still means that 43% of the
black students starting out never became lawyers, and over a fifth of those who
did become lawyers failed the bar at least once. 191

Sander also attributes the poor performance of African Americans to the
“academic mismatch” experienced by them because racial preferences
enable them to attend higher-ranked schools than their academic
credentials would warrant—a mismatch that affects their ability to
learn. 192

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
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Sander is engaged in a project known as “After the J.D.” (AJD), which
is attempting to track approximately ten percent of those who became
lawyers in the year 2000 through the first ten years of their careers. The
first fruits of the project are detailed survey data on more than 4000
attorneys in their second or third year of practice after law school—a
broadly representative sample of the entire national population of young
lawyers. Sander used these data to answer a question of great
importance to Bowen and Bok in The Shape of the River and to Lempert,
Chambers, and Adams in The River Runs Through Law School: How are
the earnings, extent of career satisfaction, and contributions to the
community of black lawyers affected by the fact they attended law
schools of high prestige but graduate with lower grades?
According to the AJD data, the “most statistically reliable predictor of
earnings variation” in private firms is the “region” variable. 193 Young
lawyers working in New York earn more than those working in
Washington, Los Angeles, or Chicago. The second most powerful
predictor of earnings is law school grades. School prestige is a distant
third. 194 The data show an association between school prestige and
income, but “in all schools outside the top ten, there is a large market
penalty for being in or near the bottom of the class.” 195 Sander’s
analysis leads him to conclude that
the effect of racial preferences in law school admissions for black students upon
their job market outcomes is overwhelmingly negative for blacks in middle- and
lower-ranked schools. It is a smaller penalty for students at schools near the top
of the status hierarchy, and it is nearly a wash—perhaps even a small plus—for
students at top-ten schools. But nowhere do I find that the prestige benefits of
affirmative action dominate the costs stemming from lower GPA. 196

Furthermore, Sander shows that his estimates understate the importance
of GPA. 197 He maintains that the “absence of preferences would greatly
increase the supply of blacks with high grades—the students both elite

193. Id. at 458.
194. Id. at 459.
195. Id. at 460. Refining his analysis, Sander shows that alumni of Tier 1 schools
earn 29.6% to 40.4% more than alumni of the lowest-status schools. Alumni of Tier 2
schools earn 16.1% to 26.6% more than alumni in the lowest-status schools.
Furthermore, “[t]here is no measurable earnings dividend from attending a more
prestigious school in the bottom half of the law school distribution.” Id. at 465.
196. Id. at 466.
197. Id.
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and ordinary employers are obviously seeking out most vigorously.” 198
In these respects, Sander’s findings corroborate those of Dale and
Krueger. 199
Sander considers other effects of ending preferential admissions and
examines the brief in Grutter filed by LSAC claiming that as many as
ninety percent of black applicants in 1990 to 1991 would not have been
admitted to any nationally-accredited law school in the United States if
grades and test scores were the sole admissions criteria. Sander thinks
this claim is “ridiculous.” 200 Black applicants, he maintains, are aware
of the existence of preferential affirmative action policies and apply to
higher prestige schools than they otherwise might in expectation of
preference. Sander does not dispute that “[i]f racial preferences suddenly
disappeared and black applicants continued to apply to the same schools
as they do now, then of course they would be rejected at a very high
rate.” 201 But if blacks applied to schools in the same manner as whites,
that is, without expectation of preferential admission, and if law schools
evaluated them in the same way they evaluated whites, Sander maintains
the results would not be those predicted by LSAC.
To support his contention, Sander refers to Professor Linda
Wightman’s study of the applicants to the class entering law school for
the 2000–2001 school year, which concluded that under a race-blind
regime, the number of blacks receiving at least one offer of admission
from an ABA-approved law school would have declined by only
fourteen percent. 202 Professor Wightman’s study of the applicants had
shown that race-blind admissions would have resulted in “reducing the
number of admitted black applicants to approximately a third of what it
was in the 1990–1991 application year.” 203 The difference between 1991
and 2001, Sander shows, was due in part to an increase in the ratio of
black applicants to white applicants—one black for every 6.5 whites—
and the slight improvement of the academic credentials of blacks relative
to those of whites. 204 Without preferential admissions, Sander estimates,
roughly eighty-six percent of black applicants would gain entry to some
law school in which they would be competitive with all other students
and their “grades, graduation rates, and bar passage rates would all

198. Id. at 468.
199. See Dale & Krueger, supra note 127, at 1523.
200. Sander, supra note 186, at 469.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 472; Linda F. Wightman, The Consequences of Race-Blindness:
Revisiting Prediction Models with Current Law School Data, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229,
229, 237 (2003).
203. Wightman, supra note 100, at 15–16.
204. Sander, supra note 186, at 471–72.
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converge toward white students’ rates. The overall rate of blacks graduating
from law school and passing the bar on their first attempt would rise
from the 45% measured by the LSAC-BPS study to somewhere between
64% and 70%.”205 The production of black lawyers would rise significantly.
Under a race-blind system, the fourteen percent of blacks who would
not gain entry into some law school have, currently, very small chances
of graduating from law school and passing the bar exam. They add
“only a comparative handful of attorneys to total national production.” 206
The percentage of blacks in the most prestigious schools, however,
would drop precipitously to one or two percent of the student body, but
the schools below the top would benefit greatly from having better
qualified black students. 207
Sander reaches these conclusions on the assumption that the current
standards of admission for whites would be the standards for all
applicants, regardless of race or ethnic origin. Bowen and Bok seriously
suggested that if colleges and universities were forbidden to take race
into account, they would lower admission standards across the board in
order to obtain the desired number of African Americans and Hispanics.208
While deploring that Bowen and Bok would choose to lower intellectual
standards rather than maintain current standards and abandon preferential
racial and ethnic admissions, the Thernstroms thought this alternative
could work. “Setting the admissions bar very low,” they wrote, “and
then accepting students more or less randomly from a very large pool
defined as qualified will yield the desired racial mix.”209 Justice Thomas
favored this alternative; but Sander demonstrates that it will not work. He
explains that if, for example, University of Michigan Law School admitted
all applicants with academic scores equal to those attained by its black
students, its first year enrollment would increase from 350 to about 1500
students. But because the standards for the admission of blacks would
remain the same, black enrollment would stay a little above twenty and
the percentage of first-year black students would fall from seven percent
to 1.4%. 210 The school might introduce a lottery to control class size,
but, if it were color-blind, the black presence would still be only 1.4%.

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 474.
Id.
Id. at 483.
BOWEN & BOK, supra note 86, at 288–89.
Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1631.
Sander, supra note 186, at 417.
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Sander does not confront the issue whether educational benefits flow
from student body racial and ethnic diversity. Although the Court upheld
the constitutionality of Michigan Law School’s preferential admissions
policy because of these educational benefits, Sander’s analysis is
intended to strike at the premise underlying this holding—that “racial
preferences are indispensable to keep a reasonable number of blacks
entering the law and reaching its highest ranks—a goal which is in turn
indispensable to a legitimate and moral social system.”211 In truth, Sander
insists, black law students “are the victims of law school programs of
affirmative action, not the beneficiaries.” 212 The actual outcome of
preferential affirmative action cannot be reconciled with its claimed
educational benefits.
Would Professor Sander’s analysis and supporting data—new legislative
facts—be admissible in a new case that asked the Supreme Court to
reconsider its decision in Grutter v. Bollinger? This issue arose in Stell
v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education, in which the District
Court admitted evidence intended to show that the Supreme Court was
wrong to conclude in Brown v. Board of Education that the separate
schooling of black and white children caused psychological injury to
black children and that a dual school system was “more favorable to the
children involved in a psychological sense, avoid[ed] the injurious
conflict arising from loss of racial identity, and result[ed] in a more
successful educational program for the students of both races.” 213
Because the district court found this evidence to have “somewhat
stronger indicia of truth than that on which the findings of potential
injury were made in Brown,” 214 it entered judgment dismissing a class
action suit to enjoin the Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education
from operating a biracial school system.
The Fifth Circuit overruled the district court’s decision and held it was
bound by Brown. “[N]o inferior federal court may refrain from acting as
required by that decision even if such a court should conclude that the
Supreme Court erred either as to its facts or as to the law.” 215 The Fifth
Circuit did not read Brown “as being limited to the facts of the cases
there presented” but “as proscribing segregation in the public education

211. Id. at 481.
212. Id.
213. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 220 F. Supp. 667, 679 (S.D.
Ga. 1963).
214. Id. at 680.
215. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55, 61 (5th Cir.
1964).
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process on the stated ground that separate but equal schools for the races
were inherently unequal.” 216
This conclusion is confusing. The Fifth Circuit may be saying that
segregated schools are “inherently unequal” for reasons other than their
harmful effect upon black school children. Evidence that they are not
harmful would then not be material to the issue of constitutionality; but
the Fifth Circuit did not explain what it meant by “inherently unequal.”
If it agreed that segregated schooling is inherently unequal because of its
deleterious effect upon school children, then the truth of that legislative
fact must always be open to question because it is determinative of
constitutionality. This does not mean that the decision of the district
court was correct. Unless a lower court has very good reason to anticipate
that the Supreme Court will overrule a decision, it must abide by that
decision. At the same time, the district court should have conducted an
evidentiary hearing on the legislative fact issue to create a record to
facilitate the Supreme Court’s reconsideration of the case.
Justice Blackmun, concurring in United States v. Leon, 217 and Justice
Souter, concurring in Washington v. Glucksberg, 218 took the position for
which I am contending. In Leon, Justice Blackmun wrote:
[A]ny empirical judgment about the effect of the exclusionary rule in a
particular class of cases necessarily is a provisional one. By their very nature,
the assumptions on which we proceed today cannot be cast in stone. To the
contrary, they now will be tested in the real world of state and federal law
enforcement, and this Court will attend to the results. If it should emerge from
experience that, contrary to our expectations, the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule results in a material change in police compliance with the
Fourth Amendment, we shall have to reconsider what we have undertaken here.
The logic of a decision that rests on untested predictions about police conduct
demands no less.

216. Id.
217. 468 U.S. 897, 927 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Court in this case
decided that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule did not bar the admission of
evidence seized in reasonable, good faith reliance on a search warrant that was
subsequently held to be defective. In coming to this conclusion, the Court engaged in a
cost-benefit analysis that found “the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently
invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” Id. at 922
(majority opinion).
218. 521 U.S. 702, 781 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
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If a single principle may be drawn from this Court’s exclusionary rule
decisions, . . . it is that the scope of the exclusionary rule is subject to change in
light of changing judicial understanding about the effects of the rule outside the
confines of the courtroom. 219

Justice Souter concurred in Glucksberg because he concluded that the
Washington statute banning assisted suicide was justified by the state’s
interests to protect terminally ill patients “from mistakenly and
involuntarily deciding to end their lives” and to guard against “both
voluntary and involuntary euthanansia.” 220 Justice Souter noted that the
Netherlands was “the only place where experience with physician-assisted
suicide and euthanasia has yielded empirical evidence about how” the
guidelines issued for the medical profession affected actual practice. 221
But, he found, there is “a substantial dispute today about what the Dutch
experience shows.” 222
Since there is little experience directly bearing on the issue, the most that can be
said is that whichever way the Court might rule today, events could overtake its
assumptions, as experimentation in some jurisdictions [like Oregon which
legalized assisted suicide] 223 confirmed or discredited the concerns about
progression from assisted suicide to euthanasia. 224

Justice Souter concluded: “While I do not decide for all time that
respondents’ claim should not be recognized, I acknowledge the legislative
institutional competence as the better one to deal with that claim at this
time.” 225 Nowhere in his opinion did Justice Souter use the term legislative
facts.
Justices Blackmun and Souter agreed that the legislative facts that are
constitutionally significant should always be open to question. And, I
would add, the Court must independently determine what they are—
even if the data, analyses, and opinions of social scientists about them
are in conflict. The Supreme Court and lower federal courts need help to
resolve such conflicts and make the required independent determinations
of legislative facts. Agreeing with the decision reached in Daubert,
Justice Breyer urged trial courts to appoint experts to assist them in
performing their gatekeeping function with respect to the admissibility
of scientific evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 226 The
219. Leon, 468 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
220. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 782 (Souter, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 785.
222. Id. at 786.
223. See generally Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (describing Oregon’s
physician-assisted suicide law).
224. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 787 (Souter, J., concurring). See generally Gonzales
v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (describing Oregon’s physician-assisted suicide law).
225. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 789 (Souter, J., concurring).
226. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147–150 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring);
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courts will also need expert assistance in dealing with nonscientific
“technical and other specialized knowledge” in the domain of the social and
behavioral sciences. In his concurring opinion in United States v. Leon,
Justice Blackmun also acknowledged that “[l]ike all courts, we face
institutional limitations on our ability to gather information about
‘legislative facts.’” 227 Dissenting in Wolf v. Colorado, and insisting that
only the exclusionary rule will deter violations of the Fourth
Amendment, Justice Murphy acted like Justice Blackmun in Roe v.
Wade. He engaged in his own empirical research, which he described in
footnote 5 of his opinion. 228 Police heads in twenty-six large cities
selected at random, including those that applied the exclusionary rule
and those that did not, responded to the Justice’s inquiries concerning
the instruction provided to their police on the rules of search and seizure.
These responses revealed a contrast between cities with the exclusionary
rule and those without it. Generally, only cities with the exclusionary
rule provided recruit training programs and in-service courses that
included extensive education in the rules of search and seizure and the
importance to the prosecution of obeying them. Justice Murphy
acknowledged that his study “cannot, of course, substitute for a
thoroughgoing comparison of present-day police procedures by a
completely objective observer.” 229
The search for a “completely objective observer” has been going on
for a long time. As early as 1923, Professor E.S. Corwin, the eminent
political scientist and constitutional lawyer, suggested that “some agency
be created for enlightening the [Supreme Court] as to such matters [as
legislative facts], upon whose results the [C]ourt could depend.” 230
see also Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a
Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995,
998 (1994).
227. 468 U.S. 897, 927 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun
pointed to the fact that “the exclusionary rule itself has exacerbated the shortage of hard
data concerning the behavior of police officers in the absence of such a rule.” Id.
Nonetheless, he concluded, “we cannot escape the responsibility to decide the question
before us, however imperfect our information may be, and I am prepared to join the
Court on the information now at hand.” Id.
228. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 44 n.5 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting). In this
case, the Court held that in a prosecution in a state court for a state crime, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit the admission of evidence
obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at 33 (majority opinion). The case
was overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
229. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 44 n.5 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
230. E.S. Corwin, Reports of the National Conference on the Science of Politics, 18
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Dean Roscoe Pound and Professor Frederick Beutel put forth the idea of
an independent research agency under the control of the courts. 231 More
recently, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis proposed that a research service
similar to the Congressional Research Service be created to assist the
In 1991, I
Supreme Court in determining legislative facts. 232
commented on the Davis proposal as follows:
If these suggestions are to have any possibility of adoption by the courts, the
proposed research institution should not be attached to any other branch of
government, nor be a permanent agency, to which it might appear the courts
were trying to delegate their undelegable powers. The National Academy of
Science and its research arm, the National Research Council, would be ideal as
research agencies for the federal courts, including the Supreme Court. They
could create task forces to deal with particular legislative fact issues referred by
the courts. Each task force would dissolve as soon as it completed its work. In
this way, the country’s experts most knowledgeable about a particular issue
would be attracted to assist the courts. 233

Not a single Justice responded favorably to Professor Davis’s
suggestion, or to mine. Yet the National Academy of Sciences–National
Research Council (NAS-NRC) comes closer to being a “completely
objective observer” than any other research institution in the country. 234
And its use of ad hoc panels to assist the Supreme Court would allay
fears of improper influence upon the Court.
It may be objected that the use of an outside research agency to assist
the courts would slow the process of judicial decisionmaking
intolerably. But, it should be noted, Bakke was decided in 1978 and
Grutter in 2003. There was time in the intervening twenty-five years for
NAS-NRC task forces to study the effects of Bakke and what, if any,
benefits flowed from preferential racial and ethnic admissions to colleges
and universities. If it is the case that reference of a social scientific issue
to an NAS-NRC panel may unduly delay a decision, the Court could
decide the case on the basis of the data available to it and,
simultaneously, commission a task force to study and report on the
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 119, 153 (1924).
231. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 214 (Transaction Publishers
1999) (1921); Frederick K. Beutel, Some Implications of Experimental Jurisprudence, 48
HARV. L. REV. 169, 181 (1934).
232. Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A
Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1986).
233. Carl A. Auerbach, A Revival of Some Ancient Learning: A Critique of
Eisenberg’s The Nature of the Common Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 539, 559 n.132 (1991).
234. The NAS has published studies on issues of constitutional significance. See,
e.g., PANEL ON RESEARCH ON DETERRENT AND INCAPACITATIVE EFFECTS, NAT’L ACAD. OF
SCIENCES, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 3 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978) (explaining the
Panel’s goal as providing objective scientific analysis of various sanctions’ effect on
crime rates).
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matter. If the resulting report indicates that the case was wrongly
decided, the Court may overrule its decision and, if appropriate, do so
prospectively only.
Because the studies I have briefly described indicate that a serious
conflict exists in the data, analyses, and opinions of social scientists
about the legislative facts on which the Court based its decision in
Grutter, the Court should be open to a fresh challenge to that decision.
NAS-NRC task forces would be helpful to the Court in dealing with that
challenge. Needless to say, the Court would have the last word. But it is
unjust to maintain a rule of constitutional law based on false assumptions of
legislative facts. I recognize that particular issues of legislative fact may
be impossible to resolve definitively. Even “completely objective observers”
may differ reasonably. If a NAS-NRC task force should report that it cannot
determine definitively whether educational benefits flow from student
body racial and ethnic diversity, and the Supreme Court agrees, then
strict scrutiny of the University of Michigan Law School’s preferential
racial and ethnic admissions program would require the Court to hold
that the program cannot be constitutionally justified by the claimed
educational benefits.
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